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Abstract: Changing dynamics of power systems caused by the migration from conventional to distributed energy sources increase
the risk of blackouts due to voltage instability, especially in case of unforeseen network conditions (e.g., (N-k)-cases). To enable a
both secure and efficient power supply, novel monitoring and emergency control systems for the identification of voltage emergency
situations as well as the execution of control actions are required that react reliably in due time and adaptively in case of changing
network situations. This paper presents a distributed agent-based approach to counteract voltage instability that is based solely
on local measurements and limited inter-agent communication. Distributed agents located at substations in the (sub-)transmission
network monitor distribution and transmission voltages as well as load tap changer positions and are able to autonomously curtail
load in case system stability is endangered. The applicability of the approach is demonstrated in a co-simulation environment
interfacing the multi-agent system with a dynamic power system simulation. The presented approach allows for an early detection
of voltage instability as well as a coordinated execution of available control actions.
1 Introduction
The large-scale integration of renewable energy sources and the
related decommissioning of conventional power plants change the
complexity and dynamics of future power grids. Especially in case
of (N-k) situations, the risk of regional or large-scale blackouts due
to long-term voltage instability has to be carefully assessed. To coun-
teract critical network conditions, novel emergency control concepts
acting timely and making use of available measures are essential for
maintaining system stability in future power systems [1]. The major
challenges for such systems are (i) a reliable reaction in due time,
(ii) the adaptability in case of changing network conditions, (iii)
the robustness to communication failures, and (iv) the coordinated
activation of countermeasures.
As an alternative to centralized system integrity protection
schemes requiring significant computational effort in case of large-
scale grids or the comprehensive installation of wide-area monitor-
ing and control systems, as proposed in [2]. is proposed. Future sub-
stations will be connected through high speed communication links
which allows for distributed controllers communicating between
each other. In particular, a Multi-Agent System (MAS) is developed
with intelligent agents situated at substations in the transmission and
subtransmission network. Agents monitor the trend of local bus volt-
ages, communicate with other agents and decide about corrective
control actions autonomously. The developed approach allows for
fast detection of an evolving voltage instability after the system is
subjected to severe disturbances as well as the autonomous activation
of countermeasures in order to restore a stable state of equilibrium
with acceptable bus voltages.
The paper is structured as follows. First, in Section 2 the state
of the art of voltage stability assessment and emergency control
concepts against voltage collapse is presented. Section 3 gives
an overview of the developed MAS including the algorithm for
the assessment of voltages and the implemented emergency con-
trol scheme. Next, Section 4 outlines the scenario setup before in
Section 5 the simulation results are presented. Finally, the paper
closes with a conclusion and an outlook on future research in the
field of (agent-based) emergency control systems for the prevention
of voltage collapse (Section 6).
2 Context and state of the art
The industry approach for securing voltage stability in normal power
system operation is often based on simple criteria: Voltage magni-
tudes are kept in pre-defined ranges and steady-state load flow based
contingency analyses are performed with a manual selection and
activation of countermeasures in case the (N-1) criterion is violated.
Additionally, system protection schemes reacting to (major) distur-
bances are installed such as under-voltage load shedding relays.
In research, the assessment of long-term voltage stability, the
computation of voltage stability margins and emergency control
schemes have been intensively studied. Here, it is differentiated
between distributed systems that solely rely on local measurements
and centralized approaches based on comprehensive system infor-
mation. One famous representative of centralized approaches is the
continuation power flow, as first proposed in [3]. Another central-
ized control approach for the improvement of voltage stability has
been proposed in [4] that is based on voltage-constrained optimal
power flow. Yet, these approaches are designed for preventive con-
trol and are not applicable to corrective actions. In contrast to these,
the authors in [5], [6] and [7] focus on corrective control of voltage
instability that is performed centrally based on information obtained
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) or based on model predictive
control. General shortcomings of centralized approaches are their
dependency on comprehensive and accurate system information and
the thread of non-convergence in case of complex optimization
problems. Some even require full observability of the network.
Distributed solutions for the local identification of voltage insta-
bility have been presented, e.g. by [8], [9] and [10]. Whereas the
first are based on tracking the Thévenin equivalent as seen from a
local bus, in [10] a control scheme has been developed that main-
tains power system voltages within pre-defined boundaries based on
model predictive control and neighbour-to-neighbour communica-
tion between the controllers. Even if the controllers solve a local
optimization based on limited system observability, the information
that are exchanged serve as an input for the optimization prob-
lem. Further methods for voltage instability detection including both
centralized and local approaches are summarized in [11] and [12].
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Additionally, distributed agent-based solutions that solely rely
on local measurements have been investigated. The general appli-
cability of MAS for real-time control problems in electric power
systems has been shown in [13]. A MAS-based solution that only
relies on information measured locally or obtained from the neigh-
bouring buses has been proposed by [14]. However, as the focus of
the aforementioned optimal reactive power control approach is the
minimization of real power losses and the improvement of voltage
profiles, it is not suitable as an emergency control scheme. Another
agent-based solution relying on distributed control and communica-
tion between neighbouring agents to counteract voltage instability
is presented in [15]. However, agents need information about volt-
age angles that, under normal circumstances, cannot be provided
without a comprehensive installation of PMUs. The authors in [16]
propose an agent-based solution that performs calculation of the dis-
tance of the current operating point to the maximum loadability. Yet,
the approach also requires information from PMUs and is based on
steady-state load flow calculations. In [17], a MAS for emergency
control against voltage collapse is proposed where agents coordinate
different devices in post-fault situations. Yet, details on the algorithm
for the identification of voltage instability are not presented. Another
agent-based approach for power system restoration after a distur-
bance has been presented in [18]. In [19], an agent-based distributed
reactive power management scheme has been presented whose pur-
pose is to improve voltage stability of distribution systems based
on inter-agent communication but is not applicable as an emergency
control concept at transmission level. One main issue of distributed
agent-based solution is the consensus problem which is defined as
agents’ need to agree on a common consent [20]. For agent-based
control of emergency situations, it is therefore critical that the sta-
bilization of the system is not prevented by the agents themselves.
For this purpose, the MAS developed in this paper is not based on
a negotiation between the agents which requires a positive outcome.
Instead, agents follow their own goals and therewith enable reaching
the main objective of stabilizing the power system.
In previous work the authors have developed an agent-based solu-
tion for the prevention of voltage collapse by a coordinated activation
of available countermeasures [21]. In parallel, in [22] and [23] the
Local Identification of Voltage Emergency Situations (LIVES) and
extended-time LIVES (eLIVES) approaches have been presented for
identifying voltage emergency situations solely based on local mea-
surements gathered at Load Tap Changer (LTC) controlled buses.
The main contribution of this paper is the extension of the afore-
mentioned solutions by combining a robust algorithm for voltage
stability assessment with a closed-loop logic for the execution of
control actions in a MAS with a dedicated consideration of the
inter-agent communication. As the approach solely relies on local
measurements, it is real-time capable, robust with respect to commu-
nication failures and adaptive towards changing network conditions.
Therefore, a fast and reliable identification of an impending long-
term voltage instability is guaranteed by keeping the necessary data
exchange between the agents to a minimum.
3 Agent-based identification of voltage
emergency situations
The main objective of the developed MAS is the detection of volt-
age instability and the coordinated execution of emergency controls
when the power system is close to voltage collapse. Here, intelligent
agents are installed at each bus equipped with LTC in the trans-
mission and/or subtransmission network, collect local measurements
and communicate with surrounding agents.
As a main feature, the distributed agents do not need complete
system information. Instead, they have a limited observability area
that is characterized by its distance d. A distance d = 1 indicates
that the agent is able to communicate with its direct neighbours,
whereas agents with a distance of d = 2 are able to communi-
cate with the neighbours of their neighbours. As the electric power
system topology and the Information and Communication Technol-
ogy (ICT) system are independent, the term distance only refers to
the connection of the buses in the power system domain. For this,
Fig. 1 visualizes the topology of the MAS interacting with the power
system and the ICT system. The MAS exchanges measurements
and control signals with the power system. In the MAS domain
agents send and receive messages. However, the physical agent com-
munication is performed in the ICT domain where each agent is
represented by one host. All hosts are connected via a router that
routes the messages sent by the agents through the network accord-
ing to existing standards. It is assumed that the outage of a single
element in the power system domain does not interfere with the ICT
system and vice versa.
power 
system
MAS
ICT
system
router
agent
host
message content
ICT data flows
measurements &
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Fig. 1: Topology of MAS environment interacting with power and
ICT system
3.1 Local identification of voltage emergency condition
The local identification of a voltage unstable situation is performed
with a modified version of the eLIVES algorithm presented in [23].
The monitoring of the system response is activated in case of LTC
tap adjustment. In order to detect an evolving voltage instability,
eLIVES observes the voltage evolution during the restoration and
analyses the overall trend of the voltage. The algorithm uses only
locally available measurements and information, namely the distri-
bution voltage at the Medium Voltage (MV) side of the transformer
and the tap ratio. The proposed algorithm accommodates variable
tap delays and is robust to measurement noise on the input signal, as
demonstrated in [23].
3.1.1 Recursive least square fitting of voltage measure-
ments: The local voltage assessment is executed when the distri-
bution voltage vmv leaves the deadband and the LTC is still active,
i.e. it has not yet reached its tap limits. After the first tap change has
been detected at time trec, the method starts recording voltage mea-
surements. These measurements are utilized to identify the trend of
the voltage evolution vfit using a linear regression model:
vfit(t) = mt · t+ bt. (1)
In each time step t, the estimator determines the parameters mt and
bt. Since the method assesses long-term voltage stability, which may
require several minutes of monitoring after a disturbance, a recursive
least squares fitting is used [24].
3.1.2 Rules for raising a local warning: When a sufficient
number of samples is collected, the slope mt is evaluated. A neg-
ative slope indicates that the voltage magnitude is declining and
i.e. load voltage (and hence power) cannot be restored to the LTC
setpoint while a positive slope suggests an overall recovery of the
LTC controlled voltage. In case the current slope mt is negative, it
is compared to the negative slope mt−1, which was computed at
the previous discrete time step. A warning is issued, if mt is more
negative than mt−1. For improving the performance of the method,
the first evaluation of the slope is delayed by twait. The delay was
chosen to give the LTC time to restore the voltage and to allow rev-
elation of the overall voltage trend. Further, it makes the algorithm
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Fig. 2: Sequence of events in the agent-based identification and control of voltage emergency situations (example with two agents)
more robust to data uncertainty. The monitoring and assessment of
voltages is stopped in two conditions:
1. vmv was restored by the respective LTC, re-entered the deadband
and remained inside longer than a pre-set time period, or
2. the LTC reaches its tap limit.
The first indicates a recovery of the distribution voltage. As voltage
stability is driven by the effect of the local LTC in combination with
all voltage controllers in the system, voltage control is lost at the
particular bus in case the LTC exhausts its tap range which should
not be interpreted as instability.
3.2 Rules for raising an alarm
Taking advantage of the communication between the distributed
agents, a situation is assumed to be critical if two or more neighbour-
ing agents raise a warning. This means that agents issuing a warning
need a confirmation from at least one of the surrounding agents until
they raise an alarm and are able to perform control actions. Thus, an
(incorrect) detection of a single agent does not result in the activation
of countermeasures. This principle is visualized in Fig. 2.
The process starts with the first tap change at tA1rec for the first,
respectively tA2rec for the second agent in this example. After an
additional waiting period twait, the agents compare their respective
voltage slopesmt andmt−1. Assuming agent A1 detects an increas-
ingly negative slope at tA1warning, it sends a warning message to all
agents within its observability area. Thus, agent A1 waits for a con-
firmation from surrounding agents and starts preparing for executing
control actions by computing the voltage deviation integralAv,t (see
Section 3.3). Hence, the preparation starts before the agent receives
a confirmation, still the execution is delayed until the reception.
As soon as another agent, e.g. A2, identifies an increased negative
slope at tA2warning, it also raises a warning and sends a message to
all of its surrounding agents. Thus, both agents issue an alarm at
tA2alarm = t
A2
warning ≈ tA1alarm. In this process, the order of sending
and receiving the warning message is irrelevant. However, agents
that did not raise a warning themselves do not participate in the exe-
cution of control actions. Even if this process causes a delay on the
first agent detecting a voltage critical situation as it is slowed down
until it receives a confirmation, the confirmation process decreases
the risk of false alarms. Moreover, the implemented load shedding
strategy detailed in Section 3.3 makes critical agents act first.
One main feature of the MAS is its robustness towards single or
even multiple communication failures. As voltage stability affects
several nodes in a region, it is assumed that another agent can
distribute the required confirmation message in case a single com-
munication path between two agents is disturbed and the respective
warning message is not received. Furthermore, neighbouring agents
can also take over in performing the required control actions in order
to keep the operability of the whole system. However, in order to
make the MAS robust towards severe communication failures, e.g.,
an outage of the complete ICT infrastructure, a local backup solution
is implemented. For this, the agent monitors the transmission voltage
at the High Voltage (HV) side of the transformer vhv.
If vhv < vhv,alarm for ∆thv,alarm, (2)
the agent is allowed to perform emergency control actions imme-
diately without the confirmation from one of the surrounding
agents. vhv,alarm is the corresponding voltage threshold whereas
∆thv,alarm is a pre-set time interval in which the voltage needs
to stay below the threshold. In order to prevent the backup system
from premature actions, vhv,alarm needs to be set conservatively.
Yet, it cannot be too low in order to allow execution of control
actions in due time and thus avoid occurrence of unacceptably low
voltages, which may trigger (under-voltage) protection equipment.
Commonly, vhv,alarm is in a range of 0.85 to 0.9 p.u.. Once an
HV alarm is issued, the value of vhv,alarm is stored for subsequent
control actions.
3.3 Emergency controls to stabilize the system
If an agent raises an alarm, after both the local identification of
an increasingly negative slope and the reception of a confirmation
message from one of the surrounding agents, the agent activates
the emergency control scheme. As the MAS serves as an emer-
gency control system against voltage collapse, the agents perform
load curtailment as this is a reliable and suitable countermeasure
to counteract voltage instability and regain a steady-state of equi-
librium [25]. Here, blocks of load are shed in several steps until
stability is restored. The load shedding strategy is designed to first
shed load at the most critical bus. For this purpose, the concept of
[26] was applied, where the time delay and the amount of load shed-
ding were adjusted according to the disturbance severity. In contrast
to this reference, the MAS only implements the time delay whereas
the amount of load shedding is fixed. Without the implementation
of a delay, multiple agents would react instantaneously after the
reception of a warning from the surrounding agents (provided they
have already detected a critical situation and have not yet received a
confirmation).
Thus, the process for the load shedding is as follows: First, an
agent stores its transmission voltage vhv,warning = vhv
(
twarning
)
at the moment it raises the warning twarning. This value serves as a
threshold for successive load curtailments. Notably, the preparation
for the load shedding starts before the reception of a confirmation in
order to enable that the most critical agents act first (see. Section 3.2
and Fig. 2). Next, at time t∗ = twarning the agent starts computing
the integral of the voltage deviation Av,t at its bus over the time
interval τ :
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–9
c© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2015 3
Page 3 of 9
IET Review Copy Only
IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited.
Content may change prior to final publication in an issue of the journal. To cite the paper please use the doi provided on the Digital Library page.
Av,t =
t∗+τ∫
t∗
(
vhv,warning − vhv (t)
)
dt. (3)
As the MAS acts in discrete time steps, Eq. (3) is modified in order
to fit for a discrete control system. Here, the voltage time deviation
Av,t is updated in every time step t starting at time t∗ = twarning:
Av,t = Av,t−1 + (t− tt−1) ·
(
vhv,warning − vhv (t)
)
. (4)
As soon as Av,t reaches the pre-set value C (and additionally the
agent has received a warning message from one of the neighbour-
ing agents), it sheds one block of load and Av,t is reset to zero.
As long as vhv stays below vhv,warning, the process is repeated,
i.e. the agent can subsequently shed further blocks of load. Thus,
the control operates in closed-loop, which further contributes to the
overall robustness of the scheme [26]. This algorithm also exhibits
an inverse time characteristic. Namely, the deeper and faster the
voltage vhv declines, the less time it takes for the integral to reach
value C. Note finally that, if the agent has not received a confirma-
tion from surrounding agents by the moment the integral reaches the
valueC, it will wait until it either receives a confirmation or the local
backup alarm is raised.
4 Scenario setup
The agent-based identification and control of voltage emergency
situations has been implemented in the Java Agent DEvelopment
(JADE)-framework which provides an environment for the mod-
elling and simulation of agents including their administration and
a messaging service. In order to demonstrate the performance of the
MAS, a co-simulation environment has been set up interfacing JADE
with DIgSILENT PowerFactory, which runs time-domain simula-
tions of the power system. For the agent communication the built-in
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Fig. 3: Topology of the IEEE Nordic Test System (based on [25])
JADE-communication has been used. The power system is simulated
with a time step size of 10 ms. Yet, the agents do not act in every time
step but in discrete steps of 500 ms which is sufficient for long-term
voltage stability.
In order to demonstrate the applicability of this approach, simu-
lations were carried out on the Nordic Test System detailed in [25],
whose network topology is shown in Fig. 3. Here, the behaviour of
the distribution network is represented by a voltage sensitive load
and a distributed generating unit in parallel. Whereas loads are mod-
elled using the well-known exponential load model and parametrized
according to [25], distributed generators can be either operated with
constant power factor or a Q(V )-characteristic, as e.g. presented in
[27]. Between v = 0.96 and 1.04 p.u. the reactive power output of
the generating unit is adjusted proportionally to the voltage devia-
tion with a deadband between v = 0.995 and 1.005 p.u.. Notably,
distributed generators are only located in the Central area. For the
load shedding a fixed block size of ∆PLS = 25 MW was chosen.
twait is 20 s, whereas vhv,alarm and thv,alarm were set to 0.9 p.u.
and 3 s, respectively. C = 3 s · 0.02 p.u. = 0.06 p.u. · s.
For analysing the performance of the MAS in stressed conditions,
the initial situation is highly loaded and not in an (N-1)-secure state
[25]. Then, a short circuit occurs on transmission line 4032-4044
at tfault = 1 s. The fault is cleared through tripping of the respec-
tive transmission line (tout = 1.1 s). Long-term voltage instability is
driven by LTCs trying to bring the distribution voltages back in their
deadbands [0.99, 1.01] p.u. and over excitation limiters controlling
the field current of generators. The system experiences voltage col-
lapse in the Central region after around 180 s. Transmission voltages
in the Northern and Southern region stay almost unaffected.
5 Simulation results
Table 1 summarizes the simulations reported in this section. First,
solely the assessment of voltages is performed and no emergency
control is applied, in order to investigate the impact of the size of the
observed area d on the performance of the algorithm. Next, emer-
gency controls are executed by the distributed agents with a varying
available flexibility defined by the minimum load PL,min that needs
to stay connected to an agent’s node with P0 being the initial load
consumption. Further, the performance of the algorithm is investi-
gated in case distributed generating units in the underlying network
support distribution voltages by feeding-in reactive power. Finally,
the robustness with respect to communication failures is simulated.
5.1 Assessment of voltages with variation of the size of the
observability area
Figure 4 shows the evolution of LTC tap ratios as well as trans-
mission and distribution voltages of selected transformers in the
Table 1 Overview of simulations
scenario load d PL,min
ICT reactive power
shedding failure strategy of DGs
A.1 0 1 − − cosϕ = 1
A.2 0 2 − − cosϕ = 1
A.3 0 3 − − cosϕ = 1
B.1 1 1 0 − cosϕ = 1
B.2 1 1 0.85P0 − cosϕ = 1
B.3 1 1 0.90P0 − cosϕ = 1
C.1 0 1 − − Q(V ) with
Qflex = 100 Mvar
C.2 1 1 0 − Q(V ) with
Qflex = 100 Mvar
C.3 0 1 − − Q(V ) with
Qflex = 50 Mvar
C.4 1 1 0 − Q(V ) with
Qflex = 50 Mvar
D.1 1 1 0 1045-1041 cosϕ = 1
D.2 1 1 0 4043-4042 cosϕ = 1
D.3 1 1 0 complete cosϕ = 1
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Fig. 4: Evolution of transmission (vhv), distribution voltages (vmv) and ratios of selected transformers in Scenario A.1
a LTC-1041-01
b LTC-4042-42
c LTC-1045-05
d LTC-4043-43
Central region in Scenario A.1. Agents start recording voltages at
the time of their first tap change at t1041rec = t1045rec = 33.0 s and
t4042rec = t
4043
rec = 35.5 s. At t = trec + twait they start the assess-
ment of the voltage slope mt. Agent 1041 is the first issuing a
warning at t1041warning = 55.5 s after identifying the negative trend
of the voltage evolution (see Fig. 4a) whereas agent 1045 raises
its warning at t1045warning = 77.9 s (see Fig. 4c). As agent 1041 has
already sent a warning message to agent 1045, both agents issue an
alarm at
t1041alarm = t
1045
alarm = t
1045
warning = 77.9 s. (5)
The agents 4042 and 4043 do not interact with the agents 1041 and
1045 due to the distance of d = 1 . Agent 4042 is the first of the
two raising a warning at t4042warning = 72.9 s. Once agent 4043 issues
a warning at
t4042alarm = t
4043
alarm = t
4043
warning = 76.4 s (6)
both agents raise the alarm (see Fig. 4b,d). Furthermore, the time of
issuing an HV alarm thv,alarm is marked. The results of Scenarios
A.1 to A.3 are summarized in Table 2.
In all three scenarios, warnings were raised at buses that are
mainly located in the Central region. As the raise of a warning is
solely based on the assessment of local voltage measurements, the
time of issuing the warning is independent from the size of the
observability area. The same applies for the HV alarms that have
been exclusively issued in the Central region where the most severe
voltage drop has been experienced. Yet, the size of the observability
area determines the number of agents an agent is able to communi-
cate with, and thus influences the time of receiving a confirmation
message and therewith the time of raising an alarm. However, it
can be seen that increasing distance d has low impact on talarm.
There is no difference between d = 2 and d = 3. A difference can
be observed for agent 1044 that receives its confirmation message
earlier in case of d > 1 as well as the agents at nodes 4051 and 4062
that only raise an alarm in case of d > 1. Remote agents issuing
a warning, e.g., agent 1022, do not get a confirmation in any sce-
nario. This is desirable since the Central region is known to be more
affected to instability and to be the place where load shedding is the
most effective [25].
5.2 Applying emergency controls with varying flexibility
Since an increase of the observed area does not impact the insta-
bility detection time at the most critical buses (e.g. 1041, 1045,
4042 and 4043), only a distance d = 1 is simulated in the follow-
ing. Figure 5 shows the evolution of transmission and distribution
voltages of the transformer connected to bus 1041 and feeding the
MV bus 01 as well as its ratio in Scenarios B.1 and B.3 . Further, the
power consumption of relevant loads in the Central region is visual-
ized. Here, the active power is normalized (p = P (t)/P0). Steps of
load shedding are marked with grey arrows.
It can be seen that voltages recover after the load curtailment in
an acceptable range in both scenarios (see Fig. 5a,b). For Scenario
Table 2 Results of assessment of voltage measurements in Scenarios A.1
to A.3
region bus time of time of alarm time ofwarning A.1 A.2 A.3 HV alarm
Central 1041 55.5 77.9 77.9 77.9 109.3
Central 1042 169.1 169.1 169.1 169.1 152.2
Central 1043 105.8 105.8 105.8 105.8 125.2
Central 1044 77.9 105.8 77.9 77.9 113.3
Central 1045 77.9 77.9 77.9 77.9 134.2
North 1022 94.3 − − − −
Central 4042 72.9 76.4 76.4 76.4 137.2
Central 4043 76.4 76.4 76.4 76.4 148.2
Central 4046 80.3 80.3 80.3 80.3 148.2
Central 4047 186.0 186.0 186.0 186.0 168.6
Central 4051 156.1 − 156.1 156.1 175.1
South 4062 129.2 − 129.2 129.2 −
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Fig. 5: Evolution of transmission (vhv), distribution voltages (vmv) and ratio of transformer 1041-01 as well as active power consumption of
relevant loads in Scenario B.1 and B.3
a Scenario B.1 - Voltages and tap ratio
b Scenario B.3 - Voltages and tap ratio
c Scenario B.1 - Power consumption
d Scenario B.3 - Power consumption
B.1, solely agents 1041 and 4042 participate in the load curtailment
(see Fig. 5c). As 1041 is the most critical bus raising the warning
first and having the most severe voltage fall, 75 MW of load are shed
at this bus, whereas agent 4042 sheds only one block of 25 MW. In
Scenario B.3, as can be seen in Fig. 5d, the amount of load shedding
is equally spread over the agents 1041, 1045, 4042 and 4043 each
curtailing 25 MW. Indeed, due to PL,min set to 90 % of the initial
load consumption P0, each agent is only allowed to shed one block
of load.
Nevertheless, this demonstrates that even in case of agents having
low available flexibility, surrounding agents take over and perform
the required load curtailment. However, the stabilized transmission
voltages settle at lower values in Scenario B.3 (see Fig. 5b) compared
to Scenario B.1 (see Fig. 5a). Table 3 summarizes the results of the
Scenarios B.1, B.2 and B.3 including the time of raising a warning
or an alarm, the stabilized transmission voltage vhv,s as well as the
total amount of load shedding ∆PLS.
Table 3 Results of assessment of voltage measurements and amount of
load shedding in Scenarios B.1 to B.3 (time values marked with ∗ indicate
identification solely in scenario B.3)
bus time of time of B.1 B.2 B.3warning alarm ∆PLS vhv,s ∆PLS vhv,s ∆PLS vhv,s
1041 55.5 77.9 75 0.975 50 0.956 25 0.944
1044 77.9 − − 0.944 − 0.935 − 0.934
1045 77.9 77.9 − 0.960 − 0.950 25 0.950
1022 113.8∗ − − 1.016 − 1.013 − 1.015
4042 72.9 76.4 25 0.963 25 0.956 25 0.958
4043 76.4 76.4 − 0.974 25 0.967 25 0.969
4051 104.8∗ − − 1.035 − 1.030 − 1.030
5.3 Assessment of emergency control in case of local
voltage support at distribution level
In scenarios C.1 to C.4, equivalent generators representing dis-
tributed generators located in the distribution network are operated
with a Q(V )-characteristic, therewith increasing the reactive power
output with decreasing distribution voltages. The generators are
equivalents replacing a large number of small units. Two different
flexibility scenarios have been simulated. For the first, the equivalent
generating units at each bus have a flexibility of Qflex = 100 Mvar
whereas for the second case it is reduced to Qflex = 50 Mvar. In
Scenarios C.1 and C.3 no emergency control is applied, while in
Scenarios C.2 and C.4 the agents are able to perform load shed-
ding. Figure 6 shows transmission and distribution voltages of the
transformers connected to bus 1041 and 4042, their tap ratios and
Table 4 Results of assessment of voltage measurements and amount of
load shedding in Scenarios C.1 to C.4 (time values marked with ∗ indicate
identification in Scenario C.2 and C.4 respectively)
C.1/C.2 C.1 C.2 C.3/C.4 C.3 C.4
bus time of time of time of ∆ time of time of time of ∆
warning alarm hv alarm PLS warning alarm hv alarm PLS
1041 115.9∗ 122.4∗ 206.6 50 89.4∗ 89.4∗ 161.7 25
1042 215.6 215.6 225.1 − 182.1 182.1 185.6 −
1043 170.7 170.7 215.1 − 122.3 122.3 173.6 −
1044 139.8 170.7 181.2 − 76.4∗ 122.3 147.7 −
1045 122.4∗ 122.4∗ 204.6 50 88.4∗ 89.4∗ 168.7 25
2031 163.7 − − − 101.9 − 277.8 −
4041 194.2 194.2 − − − − 293.7 −
4042 167.8 167.8 179.7 − 83.9∗ 83.9∗ 157.2 25
4043 75.9∗ 167.3 202.6 − 80.9∗ 83.9∗ 175.1 25
4046 167.3 167.3 202.6 − 126.3 126.3 175.1 −
4047 205.1 205.1 234.5 − 255.4 255.4 195.6 −
4051 140.8∗ − 288.9 − 252.4 − 232.9 −
4061 184.7 184.7 − − − − − −
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Fig. 6: Evolution of transmission (vhv), distribution voltages (vmv) and ratio of selected transformers as well as active power consumption of
relevant loads in Scenario C.1 and C.2
a Scenario C.1 - Voltages and tap ratio of LTC-1041-01
b Scenario C.2 - Voltages and tap ratio of LTC-1041-01
c Scenario C.1 - Voltages and tap ratio of LTC-4042-42
d Scenario C.2 - Power consumption
the normalized active power consumption of relevant loads in the
Central region in Scenarios C.1 and C.2. Due to the reactive power
support of distributed generators, distribution voltages can be kept in
an acceptable range for a longer time until voltage collapse occurs
(see Figs. 6a and c). Therewith, the time for raising a warning or
an alarm is delayed. As can be seen when comparing Fig. 6a to
Fig. 4a, the tap adjustment of LTC-1041-01 is also delayed, yet
not avoided. Notably, even if the first tap change of transformer
4042-42 takes place at 33.8 s, the start of the recording of the
voltage slope is delayed as the distribution voltage re-enters the
deadband [0.99, 1.01] p.u. at around 56 s. Nevertheless, the imple-
mented algorithm is able to identify the evolving voltage instability
and apply emergency controls in due time (see Fig. 6d) with an equal
amount of shed load compared to Scenario B.1. The results for the
Scenarios C.1 to C.4 are summarized in Table 4.
5.4 Robustness to communication failures
Figure 7 shows the transmission and distribution voltages of the
transformer connected to bus 1041 feeding MV bus 01, its tap ratio
and the normalized active power consumption of relevant loads in
the Central region in Scenarios D.1 and D.3. Further, Table 5 sum-
marizes the results for all three scenarios including the assessment
of voltages, the amount of load shedding and the stabilized trans-
mission voltages. In Scenario D.1 it is assumed that the confirmation
message from agent 1045 to agent 1041 is not delivered, whereas in
Scenario D.2 agent 4042 does not receive the message from agent
4043. Hence, in both cases, the respective agent does not participate
in emergency control actions but the surrounding agents take over.
However, as the load curtailment is delayed, voltages continue to
decline and more agents detect critical voltage deviations (AV > C)
at their respective nodes. Therefore, more load is shed compared
to the simulations in Section 5.2. Nevertheless, in both scenarios
the local backup criterion is not violated. This indicates, that the
proper operation of the proposed scheme is guaranteed in case of
single communication failures. However, a complete outage of the
ICT system as simulated in Scenario D.3 disables the whole inter-
agent communication. As a result, the agents’ local backup criterion
is activated when voltages continue to decline, and load shedding is
performed later (see Fig. 7b,d). Thus, voltages recover at lower val-
ues (see Table 5) as the voltage threshold for load shedding is now
vhv,alarm = 0.9 p.u. < vhv,warning. Therewith, the amount of load
shedding in this scenario cannot be compared to the others.
6 Conclusion and outlook
In this paper, an agent-based identification and control against volt-
age collapse has been presented. The approach extends previously
published solutions by combining a robust algorithm for voltage
instability detection and a closed-loop scheme for emergency con-
trol in a MAS. The latter enables an early and reliable identification
of an evolving voltage instability as well as a coordinated activa-
tion of countermeasures. As a main feature, the distributed agents
only rely on local measurements and limited inter-agent communi-
cation making the system real-time capable, adaptive to changing
network conditions and robust with respect to communication fail-
ures. The performance of the approach has been demonstrated in a
co-simulation environment interfacing the MAS with a time-domain
simulation of the Nordic Test System.
In future work, the simulation framework of the MAS and the
power system, as outlined in Section 3, will be extended by a ded-
icated simulator for ICT allowing for an explicit analysis of the
inter-agent communication, as presented in [28], including an inves-
tigation of maximum communication delays. Further, the perfor-
mance of the MAS will be investigated in a combined transmission-
distribution grid with a detailed representation of underlying active
distribution networks characterised by power electronic-interfaced
loads and distribution network (voltage) control schemes. Finally,
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Fig. 7: Evolution of transmission (vhv), distribution voltages (vmv) and ratio of transformer 1041-01 as well as active power consumption of
relevant loads in Scenario D.1 and D.3
a Scenario D.1 - Voltages and tap ratio
b Scenario D.3 - Voltages and tap ratio
c Scenario D.1 - Power consumption
d Scenario D.3 - Power consumption
the proposed agent-based approach will be implemented on a hard-
ware platform with each agent being represented by a single entity.
Interfacing the agents with a real-time simulation of the power
system enables a hardware-in-the-loop-simulation in order to test
and validate the agents’ performance in real-life conditions. A first
attempt is demonstrated in [29] where agents for autonomous control
of power flows were implemented on standard computer hardware
which indicates the general economic feasibility.
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Table 5 Results of assessment of voltage measurements and amount of load shedding in Scenarios D.1 to D.3 (∗ indicate that alarm is not raised due
to outage of communication path)
D.1 D.2 D.3
bus time of time of ∆PLS vhv,s time of time of ∆PLS vhv,s time of time of ∆PLS vhv,s
warning alarm warning alarm warning hv alarm
1041 55.5 −∗ − 0.923 55.5 77.9 100 0.977 55.5 109.3 50 0.915
1043 − − − 0.944 − − − 0.983 105.8 − − 0.927
1044 77.9 − − 0.932 77.9 − − 0.941 77.9 127.2 50 0.906
1045 77.9 77.9 50 0.949 77.9 77.9 − 0.957 77.9 − − 0.921
1022 − − − 1.019 − − − 1.013 94.3 − − 1.001
4042 72.9 76.4 50 0.963 72.9 −∗ − 0.957 72.9 − − 0.921
4043 76.4 76.4 25 0.970 76.4 76.4 25 0.970 76.4 − − 0.939
4046 80.4 80.4 − 0.977 − − − 0.977 80.4 − − 0.951
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–9
8 c© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2015
Page 8 of 9
IET Review Copy Only
IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited.
Content may change prior to final publication in an issue of the journal. To cite the paper please use the doi provided on the Digital Library page.
References
[1] European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
(ENTSO-E), ’Network Code on Emergency and Restoration,’ March 2015.
[2] CIGRE WG B5.14, ’Wide Area Protection and Control Technolo-
gies,’ Technical Brochure 644, Sept 2016.
[3] V. Ajjarapu and C. Christy, ’The continuation power flow: a tool
for steady state voltage stability analysis’, IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol.7,
no.1, pp.416-423, Feb 1992.
[4] T. Zabaiou, L.A. Dessaint, and I. Kamwa, ’Preventive control
approach for voltage stability improvement using voltage stability con-
strained optimal power flow based on static line voltage stability indices,’
IET Generation, Transmission Distribution, vol.8, no.5, pp.924-934, May
2014.
[5] M. Glavic and T. Van Cutsem, ’Wide-Area Detection of Voltage
Instability From Synchronized Phasor Measurements. Part I: Principle,’
IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol.24, no.3, pp.1408-1416, Aug 2009.
[6] A.G. Beccuti, T.H. Demiray, G. Andersson, and M. Morari, ’A
Lagrangian Decomposition Algorithm for Optimal Emergency Voltage
Control,’ IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol.25, no.4, pp.1769-1779, Nov 2010.
[7] B. Milosevic and M. Begovic, ’Voltage-stability protection and con-
trol using a wide-area network of phasor measurements,’ IEEE Trans.
Power Syst., vol.18, no.1, pp.121-127, Feb 2003.
[8] K. Vu, M.M. Begovic, D. Novosel, and M.M. Saha, ’Use of local
measurements to estimate voltage stability margin,’ IEEE Trans. Power
Syst., vol.14, no.3, pp.1029-1035, Aug 1999.
[9] W. Li, Y. Wang, and T. Chen, ’Investigation on the Thevenin equiv-
alent parameters for online estimation of maximum power transfer limits,’
IET Generation, Transmission, Distribution, vol.4, no.10, pp.1180-1187,
Oct 2010.
[10] M. Moradzadeh, R. Boel, and L. Vandevelde, ’Voltage Coordination
in Multi-Area Power Systems via Distributed Model Predictive Control,’
IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol.28, no.1, pp.513-521, Feb 2013.
[11] J. Modarresi, E. Gholipour, and A. Khodabakhshian, ’A compre-
hensive review of the voltage stability indices,’ Renewable and Sustainable
Energy Reviews, vol.63, pp.1-12, Sept 2016.
[12] M. Glavic and T. Van Cutsem, ’A short survey of methods for volt-
age instability detection,’ in 2011 IEEE PES General Meeting, July 2011,
pp.1-8.
[13] S. McArthur, E. Davidson, V. Catterson et al., ’Multi-Agent Sys-
tems for Power Engineering Applications - Part I: Concepts, Approaches,
and Technical Challenges,’ IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol.22, no.4,
pp.1743-1752, Nov 2007.
[14] W. Zhang, W. Liu, X. Wang, L. Liu, and F. Ferrese, ’Distributed
Multiple Agent System Based Online Optimal Reactive Power Control for
Smart Grids,’ IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol.5, no.5, pp.2421-2431, Sept
2014.
[15] S.R. Islam, K.M. Muttaqi, and D. Sutanto, ’Multi-agent receding
horizon control with neighbour-to-neighbour communication for preven-
tion of voltage collapse in a multi-area power system,’ IET Generation,
Transmission Distribution, vol.8, no.9, pp.1604-1615, Sept 2014.
[16] F. Baalbergen, M. Gibescu, and L. van der Sluis, ’Agent-based
real-time voltage instability detection with maximum loadability index,’ in
45th International Universities Power Engineering Conference, Aug 2010,
pp.1-6.
[17] D.A. Panasetsky and N.I. Voropai, ’A multi-agent approach to coor-
dination of different emergency control devices against voltage collapse,’
in 2009 IEEE Bucharest PowerTech, June 2009, pp.1-7.
[18] T. Nagata and H. Sasaki, ’A multi-agent approach to power system
restoration,’ IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol.17, no.2, pp.457-462, May 2002.
[19] M.S. Rahman, M.A. Mahmud, A.M.T. Oo, H.R. Pota, and M.J.
Hossain, ’Agent-based reactive power management of power distribu-
tion networks with distributed energy generation,’ Energy Conversion and
Management, vol.120, pp.120-134, July 2016.
[20] R. Olfati-Saber, J.A. Fax, and R.M. Murray, ’Consensus and
cooperation in networked multi-agent systems,’Proceedings of the
IEEE,vol.95,no.1,pp.215-233, Jan 2007.
[21] L. Robitzky, S. Dalhues, M. Albrecht, S.C. Müller, U. Häger, and C.
Rehtanz, ’Agent-Based Prevention of Voltage Collapse in Electrical Trans-
mission Systems,’ in 19th Power Systems Computation Conference, June
2016, pp.1-7.
[22] C. Vournas and T. Van Cutsem, ’Local Identification of Voltage
Emergency Situations,’ IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol.23, no.3, pp.1239-
1248, Aug 2008.
[23] T. Weckesser, L. Papangelis, C.D. Vournas, and T. Van Cutsem,
’Local identification of voltage instability from load tap changer response,’
Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks, vol.9, pp.95-103, 2017.
[24] M.I. Jordan, ’Notes on recursive least squares,’ Oct 1998.
[25] IEEE PES Power System Dynamic Performance Committee, ’Test
Systems for Voltage Stability Analysis and Security Assessment,’Technical
Report PES-TR19, Aug 2015.
[26] B. Otomega and T. Van Cutsem, ’Undervoltage load shedding using
distributed controllers,’ IEEE Trans.Power Syst., vol.22, no.4, pp.1898-
1907, Nov 2007.
[27] Forum Netztechnik/Netzbetrieb im VDE, ’E-VDE-AR-N-4110:
Technical requirements for the connection and operation of customer
installations to the medium voltage network,’ March 2017.
[28] H. Georg, S.C. Müller, C. Rehtanz, and C. Wietfeld, ’Analyzing
Cyber-Physical Energy Systems: The INSPIRE Cosimulation of Power
and ICT Systems Using HLA,’ IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat., vol.10, no.4,
pp.2364-2373, Nov 2014.
[29] N. Dorsch, F. Kurtz, S. Dalhues, L. Robitzky, U. Häger, and
C. Wietfeld, ’Intertwined: Software-defined communication networks for
multi-agent system-based smart grid control,’ in 2016 IEEE International
Conference on Smart Grid Communications, Nov 2016, pp.254-259.
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–9
c© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2015 9
Page 9 of 9
IET Review Copy Only
IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited.
Content may change prior to final publication in an issue of the journal. To cite the paper please use the doi provided on the Digital Library page.
